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377 
REGULATING THROUGH TRADE: THE 
CONTESTATION AND RECALIBRATION 
OF EU ‘DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE’ 
FTAS 




Contemporary international trade politics is primarily focused on 
deep integration – that is, the removal of regulatory barriers to 
trade. The EU, in particular, has long been one of the main 
proponents of the use of trade agreements to promote regulatory 
disciplines on issues such as intellectual property regulation, 
procurement, services, competition and investment protection. This 
so-called ‘EU regulatory agenda’ has rapidly gathered pace over 
the past decade and culminated, more recently, in attempts to 
conclude mega-regional trade agreements such as the EU-US 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Such agreements 
have, however, proved highly contentious and are being fiercely 
contested - both because of their potential impact on the regulatory 
autonomy of the EU and its Member States, and their potential 
adverse effect on third countries and the multilateral trading system. 
This Article discusses the evolution of the EU regulatory agenda, 
the manner in which the agenda has been contested from a 
constitutional and policy perspective, and the extent to which the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For over a decade, the European Union (“EU”) has been 
intensively negotiating and signing so-called “deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements,” (“DCFTAs”) which seek to 
go beyond the removal of traditional barriers to trade and address a 
variety of regulatory issues.1  This “deep”2 or “regulatory”3 trade 
agenda is part of a wider global trend wherein international trade 
law and policy has progressively moved away from its historical 
focus in removing barriers to trade at the border, such as tariffs and 
quotas (negative integration); and, is increasingly focused on the 
adoption of global common regulatory frameworks and pursuit of 
regulatory harmonization (“deep integration”).4  It is a trend that is 
in part due to the success of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Tariffs (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organisation 
(“WTO”) in reducing tariffs, which has in turn highlighted the need 
to address less visible ‘behind-the-border’ obstacles to trade which 
result from regulatory divergence.5  It is also the result of 
fundamental shifts in the structure of the global trading system, such 
as the rising importance of trade in services and the globalization of 
                                                            
1 See Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Free Trade 
Agreements, at 7–16, COM (2017) 654 final (Nov. 11, 2017), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0654&from=HU. 
2 Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, The EU and the New Trade 
Politics, 13 J.  EUR. PUB. POL’Y 795, 795–814 (2006). 
3 Dirk De Bièvre, The EU Regulatory Trade Agenda and the Quest for 
WTO Enforcement, 13 J.  EUR. PUB. POL’Y 851, 858–59 (2006). 
4 Jacques Pelkmans, Economic Theories of Integration Revisited, 18 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUDS. 333, 349 (1980). 
5 See Chad. P. Bown, Trade Policy Instruments Over Time, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE POL. ECON. OF INT’L TRADE 57, 58 (Lisa L. Martin ed., 2015) 
(discussing the variety of instruments governments use to conduct international 
trade policy); see generally Céline Carrère & Jamie De Melo, Non-Tariff 
Measures: What do we Know, What Might Be Done?, 26 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 
169, 169–96 (2011); Greg Anderson, Hemispheric Integration in the Post-Seattle 
Era: The Promise and Problems for the FTAA, 56 INT’L J. 205, 216 (2001); 
William A. Dymond & Michael M. Hart, Post-Modern Trade Policy: Reflections 
on the Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations After Seattle, 34 J. WORLD 
TRADE 21, 21 (2000). 
3
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supply chains.6  The EU’s current approach to DCFTAs is therefore 
not something that is particularly unique to the EU; the use of FTAs 
to address regulatory barriers to trade and promote market-liberal 
regulatory frameworks that protect the assets and interests of firms 
is a policy that has been pursued by other large trade powers7.  Aside 
from these economic drivers, other considerations underpin the 
EU’s contemporary free trade agreements (“FTAs”).  Over the 
years, the EU has been at pains to stress that its trade policy is not 
exclusively aimed at promoting its economic interests, but also at 
disseminating its values abroad8.  Trade agreements have thus been 
used to export the EU’s regulatory approaches to issues such as 
environmental protection, food, safety, and human and social rights. 
The EU’s regulatory agenda in trade has encountered a 
degree of success over the past decade.  The EU has been able to 
sign a number of deep and comprehensive trade agreements 
(“DCTAs”) with developed and developing countries, which 
include disciplines on a wide variety of regulatory issues from 
intellectual property protection and technical regulations to 
competition policy, procurement, and environmental protection.9  
                                                            
6 See Emily J. Blanchard, A Shifting Mandate: International Ownership, 
Global Fragmentation, and a Case for Deeper Integration under the WTO, 14 
WORLD TRADE REV. 87, 92–93 (2015) (discussion of how global fragmentation 
can lead to behind-the-border policy manipulation); Richard Baldwin, WTO 2.0: 
Governance of 21st Century Trade 9 REV. INT’L ORGAN. 261, 265–66 (2014) 
(standing for the proposition that internationalization of production creates a new 
supply-chain trade). 
7 See, e.g., Alberta Sbragia, The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: 
Competitive Interdependence in the Management of Globalization, 17 J. EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y 368, 376 (2010); Christopher M Dent, Freer Trade, More 
Regulation? Commercial Regulatory Provisions in Asia-Pacific Free Trade 
Agreements, 14 COMPETITION & CHANGE 48, 48–76 (2010). 
8 EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRADE FOR ALL: TOWARDS A MORE 
RESPONSIBLE TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 22–26 (Oct. 2015), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf 
[hereinafter TRADE FOR ALL]; Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade, Growth, and World Affairs 
– Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, at 15, COM 
(2010) 612 final (Nov. 9, 2010), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0612:FIN:EN:PDF. 
9 For an overview, see Jacques Pelkmans, Business Dimensions of EU’s 
new FTAs, 7 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 782 (2017); see also Valerie Demedts, Which 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/2
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More recently, the EU has engaged in negotiations with large trade 
powers such as Canada, the US, and Japan to conclude so-called 
mega-regional trade agreements.10  These countries are significant 
both in terms of the markets they encompass and the type of 
regulatory disciplines addressed.  However, this agenda is 
increasingly contested both domestically and internationally.11  
Within the EU, politicians and civil society organisations have 
criticised recent trade agreements, arguing that by addressing 
regulatory issues, these agreements undermine law-making 
processes and reduce regulatory autonomy.12  These concerns were 
reflected in a European Commission Communication published in 
2015, which called for a more transparent and values-based trade 
agenda.13  From a constitutional perspective, there are also 
misgivings regarding the compatibility of these agreements with EU 
law and, in particular, the competence of the EU to address certain 
regulatory issues through such agreements.  The use of trade 
                                                            
Future for Competition in the Global Trade System: Competition Chapters in 
FTAs', 49 J. WORLD TRADE 407, 407–436 (2015); Sangeeta Khorana & Maria 
Garcia, Procurement Liberalization Diffusion in EU Agreements: Signalling 
Stewardship? 48 J. WORLD TRADE 481–500 (2014); Sikina Jinnah & Elisa 
Morgera, Environmental Provisions in US and EU Trade Agreements: A 
Comparative Analysis, REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 324–39 (2013); 
Stephen Woolcock, Policy Diffusion in Public Procurement: The Role of Free 
Trade Agreements, 18 INT’L NEGOT. 153–73 (2013). 
10 Stefanie Rosskopf, New Challenges for EU Trade Policy-making: Why 
is the EU Pursuing a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with 
Canada?, in THE EU AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND 
STRATEGIC CHOICES 177, 216 (Finn Laursen, ed., 2016). 
11 Finn Laursen & Christilla Roederer-Rynning, Introduction: The New 
EU FTAs as Contentious Market Regulation 39 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 763–77 
(2017); Ferdi De Ville & Gabriel Siles-Brugge, Why TTIP is a Game-Changer 
and its Critics Have Point, 24 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1491, 1491–1505 (2016); see 
HANDBOOK ON THE EU AND INT’L TRADE (Sangeeta Khorana & María García 
eds., 2018). 
12 Gabriel Siles-Brügge, Transatlantic Investor Protection as a Threat to 
Democracy: The Potency and Limits of an Emotive Frame, 30 CAMBRIDGE REV. 
INT’L AFF. 464, 464–88 (2018); Laurie A. Buonanno, The New Trade Deals and 
the Mobilisation of Civil Society Organizations: Comparing EU and US 
Responses, 39 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 795, 795–809 (2017); Christilla Roederer-
Rynning & Morten Kallestrup, National Parliaments and the New 
Contentiousness of Trade, 39 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 811, 811–25 (2017). 
13 TRADE FOR ALL, supra note 8, at 20–26. 
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agreements to export norms has also been criticised because it 
challenges perceived notions of what the EU is and how it acts in 
world politics.  In accordance with the EU Treaties, the EU is bound 
to carry out its trade policy in a manner that reflects foundational 
values and objectives, such as the consolidation of the rule of law, 
the promotion of sustainable development, and multilateral 
cooperation.  It is typically portrayed as a foreign policy power 
which is ontologically predisposed to uphold and promote such 
values.  Yet, the EU’s regulatory agenda raises questions about the 
EU’s commitment to such values because of its potential impact on 
the ability of developing economies to adopt measures in the public 
interest, and because these trade agreements are increasingly viewed 
as a threat to the WTO and its centrality in rule-making14.   
This Article seeks to provide a broad overview of the EU 
regulatory trade agenda in recent years, how the manner in which it 
has been contested by multiple actors has evolved, and to discuss 
the internal and external tensions that have consequently been 
exposed.  Section II provides an overview of the rationale of the EU 
regulatory agenda and how this policy framework has expanded 
over the last decade, both in terms of the countries with which the 
EU negotiates and the regulatory issues addressed in such 
agreements.  Section III discusses the points of tension resulting 
from the EU regulatory agenda; from concerns regarding the effect 
of the rules included in these agreements on national policy 
autonomy, to the concerns of countries that are reluctant to carry out 
the type of regulatory reforms demanded by the EU in its trade 
agreements.  Section IV discusses the internal tensions associated 
with the regulatory trade agenda in more detail by focusing on the 
issue of the EU’s competence to negotiate regulatory issues in trade 
agreements and the concerns relating to the lack of democratic 
accountability regarding regulatory cooperation mechanisms 
included within these agreements.  Section V examines the extent to 
which the EU’s regulatory agenda can be squared with the 
prevailing narratives surrounding the EU’s identity as an 
international actor and, more generally, the EU’s commitment to 
                                                            
14 See Jane Kelsey, From GATS to TiSA: Pushing the Trade in Services 
Regime Beyond the Limits, in 7 EUR. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ECON. LAW 119, 119–
51 (Marc Bungenberg et al., 2016); Laursen & Roederer-Rynning, supra note 11, 
at 763–77; HANDBOOK ON THE EU AND INT’L TRADE, supra note 11, at 13. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/2
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promote the multilateral trading system and carry out a trade policy 
that reflexively takes account of external actors. 
II. THE EU REGULATORY AGENDA 
A. Promoting Rules through Trade Agreements: The Global 
Europe Strategy 
The EU has been a steadfast supporter of attempts to 
promote deeper integration in international trade law.  It was one of 
the main proponents of the WTO and, in the years following its 
establishment, repeatedly called for the negotiation of further WTO 
rules addressing regulatory barriers to trade.15  Most notably, the EU 
proposed the negotiation of multilateral agreements dealing with 
investment, competition, transparency in government procurement 
and trade facilitation16 at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore 
in 1996.  Two years later, it would also advocate the introduction of 
labour and environmental protection issues within the fabric of 
WTO law.17  However, these proposals were rejected by the WTO 
membership, in particular (though not exclusively) developing 
country WTO Members, who were keen to maintain the focus of the 
negotiations on traditional market access issues of importance to 
them.  They were also reluctant to agree to new disciplines that 
would create additional compliance costs and were perceived, in 
some cases, to further circumscribe the ability of WTO Members to 
adopt national policies intended to promote economic 
development.18 
Faced with a WTO in a state of paralysis – a paralysis which 
culminated with the suspension of the Doha Development Round 
                                                            
15 Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, We Care About You, But . . .’: 
The Politics of EU Trade Policy and Development, CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 
497, 509 (2013); David Allen & Michael Smith, Relations with the Rest of the 
World, 46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 165, 169 (2008). 
16 See Steve Woolcock, The Singapore Issues in Cancún: A Failed 
Negotiation Ploy or a Litmus Test for Global Governance?, 38 INTERECON. 249, 
254 (2003). 
17 De Bièvre, supra note 3, at 858–59. 
18 Simon J. Evenett, Five Hypotheses Concerning the Fate of the 
Singapore Issues in the Doha Round, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 392, 392 
7
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negotiations in 2007 – the EU followed other trade powers such as 
the US in pursuing deep integration through bilateral trade 
agreements, where their increased negotiating leverage would 
enable them to impose the type of concessions and regulatory 
reforms they were unable to push through at the multilateral level.  
This EU regulatory agenda materialized in the form of the EU 
Global Europe strategy,19 a trade policy framework devised by the 
European Commission in 2007, targeting the negotiation of deep 
and comprehensive trade agreements with large emerging 
economies that maintained significant barriers to trade with respect 
to the EU.  The Global Europe Strategy represented a significant 
departure from the EU’s past trade policy.  In the years that preceded 
it, the European Commission had focused all of its efforts on the 
negotiations at the WTO Doha Development Round in the hopes of 
concluding multilateral trade agreements.  The European 
Commission had previously eschewed bilateral and regional trade 
agreements, viewing them as a distraction.  Some bilateral trade 
agreements were concluded by the EU in this period, but these were 
few and far between and, to a large extent, motivated by political 
and security purposes.  This included, for instance, trade agreements 
concluded in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
which covers the EU and neighbouring counties located in Eastern 
Europe (e.g., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine) and the Mediterranean (e.g., Algeria, Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, 
and Tunisia), and allows for a deeper level of economic integration 
with the EU by promoting the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire.20  The Global Europe Strategy, by contrast, 
                                                            
(2007); see also Kevin P. Gallagher, Understanding Developing Country 
Resistance to the Doha Round, 15 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 62, 62 (2007). 
19 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions: Global Europe Competing in the World – A Contribution to the EU’s 
Growth and Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567 final (Oct. 4, 2006), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:en:PDF. 
20 Marise Cremona & Gabriella Meloni, The European Neighbourhood 
Policy: A Framework for Modernisation? 7 (European Univ. Inst. Working Paper 
No. 21, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024102; see 
Roman Petrov et al., The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: A New Legal 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/2
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heralded a new era of commercially-driven EU trade agreements.21  
This policy shift was in part justified by the need to play catch-up 
with the US, which had been pursuing a policy of signing ambitious 
and comprehensive trade agreements since the early 2000s.22 This 
meant that there was a growing danger that EU firms would find 
themselves discriminated against compared to their US counterparts 
in terms of accessing global markets.  It was also an implicit 
acknowledgment that at that time, the WTO was no longer viewed 
as a realistic venue for trade negotiations.  The new generation of 
deep and comprehensive EU trade agreements would therefore seek 
to address many of the issues which the EU had failed to push 
though at WTO level (public procurement, competition, other 
regulatory issues and IPR enforcement), something which was 
explicitly acknowledged in the Global Europe Strategy.23 These 
agreements targeted the emerging economies (e.g., India, China, 
Mercosur, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”)), which had played a key role in opposing the EU’s 
reform proposals in the WTO.  
The initial record of the EU’s regulatory agenda as embodied 
by the Global Europe Strategy was mixed.  On the one hand, the EU 
did succeed in concluding a number of trade agreements which went 
significantly beyond what was then provided under WTO law.  The 
DCFTAs concluded with Korea, the CARIFORUM group of states, 
Colombia, and Peru all include rules on issues which remain largely 
unregulated at WTO level.24  In certain areas, the EU DCFTAs 
                                                            
Instrument of Integration Without Membership?, KYIV-MOHYLA L. & POL. J. 1, 
18 (2015) (reviewing the recently concluded EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement). 
21 Alasdair R. Young, European Trade Policy in Interesting Times, 39 J. 
EUR. INTEGRATION 909, 911 (2017); Stephen Woolcock, EU Policy on 
Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s: A Reorientation Towards 
Commercial Aims, 20 EUR. L.J. 718, 718–32 (2014). 
22 Charles P. Barfield, US Trade Policy: The Emergence of Regional and 
Bilateral Alternatives to Multilateralism, 42 INTERECON. 236, 237 (2007); 
Woolcock, supra note 21, at 721. 
23 Infra, note 19, at 9. 
24 ALASDAIR YOUNG & JOHN PETERSON, PAROCHIAL GLOBAL EUROPE: 
21ST CENTURY TRADE POLITICS 189 (2014); RAYMOND AHEARN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41143, EUROPE’S PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
STATUS, CONTENT, AND IMPLICATIONS 13–26 (2011), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf; Maria Garcia, Fears and Strategies: The 
9
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require parties to comply with plurilateral agreements negotiated 
within the framework of the WTO.  This is the case with respect to 
public procurement25 and telecommunication services,26 where the 
EU policy is to require trading partners to sign up to the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) Reference Paper on 
Telecommunications.  In other cases, the EU DCFTA requires 
parties to comply with existing international rules and standards 
developed outside of the WTO.  This includes requirements to 
reaffirm commitments to comply and ratify international treaties 
concluded under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO),27 minimum labour and environmental 
                                                            
European Union, China and their Free Trade Agreements in East Asia, 6 J. 
CONTEMP. EUR. RESEARCH 508 (2010). 
25 See, e.g., Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its 
Member states, of the other part, 2008 O.J. (L 289/I/3) arts. 165–82 [hereinafter 
CARIFORUM-EC EPA] (outlining the importance of public procurement in trade 
agreements between the European Community and various nations); Free Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, 2011 O.J. (L 127) arts. 9.1–9.3 
[hereinafter EU-Korea FTA]; Trade Agreement between the European Union and 
its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, 2012 
O.J. (L 354) arts. 172–194 [hereinafter EU-Colombia & Peru FTA]; Free Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore arts. 9.1–
9.20, Oct. 15, 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 
[hereinafter EU-Singapore FTA]; Agreement between the European Union and 
Japan for an Economic Partnership art. 10.1, July 17, 2018, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1684 [hereinafter EU-Japan 
EPA]. 
26 See, e.g., CARIFORUM-EC EPA, supra note 25, arts. 94–102 
(outlining the importance of telecommunication services in trade agreements 
between the European Community and various nations); EU-Korea FTA, supra 
note 25, arts. 7.27–7.37; EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra note 25, arts. 139–50; 
EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, arts. 8.24–8.48; Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European 
Union and its Member States, of the other part, 2017 O.J. (L 11) art. 14.1 
[hereinafter CETA]. 
27 See, e.g., CARIFORUM-EC EPA, supra note 25, art. 143 (outlining 
the importance of other provisions in trade agreements between the European 
Community and various nations); EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra note 25, art. 
196; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, art. 10.4; CETA, supra note 26, art. 20.7; 
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 25, art. 14.3. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/2
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protection standards provided for under the International Labour 
Organisation,28 and a series of multilateral environmental 
agreements.29 The EU DCFTA also requires  the implementation of 
technical standards in line with existing international standards 
multilateral agreements (e.g., automotive sector).30  Finally, in some 
cases the EU used its trade agreements to export its own rules.  For 
example, for want of existing multilateral rules, EU trade 
agreements have typically replicated the text of EU Directives on 
intellectual property enforcement as well as that of the EU Treaties 
on competition matters such as the abuse of dominant position.31  
Whilst the substance of these trade agreements reflects the 
aspirations of the EU’s regulatory agenda, the EU has failed to 
conclude any agreement with the largest economies identified in the 
Global Europe Strategy.  Negotiations with India failed because of 
India’s reluctance to bind itself to high standards of intellectual, 
labour and environmental protection as well as the EU’s refusal to 
offer commitments on Mode 4 access (temporary movement of 
service providers).32  Similarly, progress in the EU-Mercosur trade 
negotiations have been painstakingly slow, with parties struggling 
to reach an agreement on contentious issues such as liberalisation in 
the agricultural sector.33  As for ASEAN, the EU struggled to find 
                                                            
28 See, e.g., EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 13.4 (discussing 
multilateral labour standards and agreements); EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra 
note 25, art. 269; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, art. 12.3; EU-Japan EPA, 
supra note 25, art. 16.3. 
29 See, e.g., EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 13.5 (discussing 
multilateral environmental agreements); EU-Colombia & Peru FTA, supra note 
25, art. 270; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 25, art. 12.6. 
30 See, e.g., EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 15.3(1)(a) (discussing 
work groups that are established the auspices of the Trade Committee); EU-Japan 
EPA, supra note 25, at Annex 2-C. 
31 See Billy A. Melo Araujo, Intellectual Property and the EU’s Deep 
Trade Agenda, 16 J. INT'L ECON. L. 439, 439–74 (2013).  
32 India-EU FTA negotiations likely to resume soon, ECON. TIMES, (Mar. 
26, 2018, 6:18 PM), 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-eu-fta-
negotiations-likely-to-resume-soon/articleshow/63467513.cms. 
33 See Patrick Messerlin, The Mercosur-EU Preferential Trade 
Agreement: A View from Europe 1, 4 (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working 
Paper No. 377, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277476; CT Report, 
11
388 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:2 
common ground between the countries composing this free trade 
arrangement because of their disparate levels of economic 
development, and eventually decided to negotiate agreements on an 
individual basis.34  In short, the EU found that the stumbling blocks 
it had encountered at WTO level were also present in the context of 
bilateral negotiations with large emerging economies.  
Unsurprisingly, the EU has since only successfully concluded trade 
agreements with either similarly-minded economies (e.g., South 
Korea, Canada, or Singapore), or small developing economies 
where it can use its increased leverage to impose its agenda (e.g., 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Central American states, Vietnam). 
B. Global Europe Strategy 2.0: Reshaping the Rules of the Game 
through Mega-Regionals 
The EU’s policy with respect to negotiating DCFTAs has in 
recent years significantly exceeded the initial parameters set out in 
the Global Europe Strategy, both in terms of the scope of the rules 
included in these agreements and in the identity of the EU’s 
negotiating partners.  A first significant development was the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010, which increased the scope 
of the EU’s exclusive competence in external trade matters by 
providing that the Common Commercial policy would also cover 
“foreign direct investment.”35  The immediate consequence of the 
expansion of the EU’s external competence is that all EU DCFTAs 
negotiations that were initiated in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Lisbon have included comprehensive chapters on investment 
                                                            
Germany wants EU-Mercosur trade agreement this year, CUSTOMS TODAY (June 
7, 2017), http://www.customstoday.com.pk/germany-wants-eu-mercosur-trade-
agreement-this-year/. 
34 Locknie Hsu, EU-ASEAN Trade and Investment Relations with 
Special Focus on Singapore, 6 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 233, 233–50 (2015). 
35 Markus Krajewski, The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy, in 
EU LAW AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 292–311 (Andrea Biondi et al., eds., 
2012); Siegfried Fina & Gabriel M. Lentner, The Scope of the EU's Investment 
Competence after Lisbon, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 419, 419–20 (2016); 
Ramses A. Wessel & Tamara Takács, Constitutional Aspects of the EU’s Global 
Actorness: Increased Exclusivity in Trade and Investment and the Role of the 
European Parliament 28 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 103, 110 (2017). 
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protection regulating both direct and indirect investments and 
subject to investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms.36  
The second significant development concerns the EU’s increasing 
willingness to negotiate trade agreements with other large developed 
economies.  The EU’s decision to participate in negotiations on a 
Trade in Services Agreement is indicative of this.37  The Trade in 
Services Agreement is a plurilateral trade agreement focused 
exclusively on services liberalisation, which is currently being 
negotiated by twenty-three mostly-developed nations.38 The EU has 
also engaged in important bilateral trade negotiations.  First, the EU 
engaged in negotiations with Canada regarding a comprehensive 
economic trade agreement—the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (“CETA”),39 which was subsequently followed by 
talks of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) 
with the US as well as a DCFTA with Japan.  The last two 
agreements were motivated both by economic and geopolitical 
considerations and, in particular, the US’s decision to negotiate the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)—an agreement which was 
intended to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region (including 
countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Vietnam, and New Zealand)—and counter China’s growing 
political and economic influence in the region.40  For the EU, the 
TPP represented a challenge to the extent that it would have 
effectively allowed for the discrimination of EU firms and exporters 
in terms of accessing rapidly growing and lucrative markets in Asia.  
                                                            
36 Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and the European Union: 
Towards a New Generation of International Investment Agreements, 26 EUR. J. 
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37 Juan A. Marchetti & Martin Roy, The TISA Initiative: An Overview of 
Market Access Issues, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 683, 684 (2014). 
38 Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
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39 Teresa Healy, Canadian and European Unions and the Canada–EU 
CETA Negotiations, 11 GLOBALIZATIONS 59, 59 (2014). 
40 See Reeve T. Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory 
Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3–5 (2015); Leif Johann Eliasson & 
Patricia Garcia-Duran, Why TTIP is an Unprecedented Geopolitical Game-
Changer, but not a Polanyian Moment, 24 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1522–33 (2017). 
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The TPP was also problematic insofar as it was viewed and 
presented by its proponents as an opportunity to address the type of 
regulatory issues which are increasingly disruptive to global trade, 
but which were unregulated at the WTO level.  This would include 
rules on competition, state owned enterprises, electronic commerce, 
labour and environmental protection and even, to a lesser extent, 
currency manipulation.41  The US, in particular, was keen to stress 
the importance of the TPP as an opportunity to re-assert the US’s 
hegemony in global economic governance and maintain its central 
role in writing “the rules of the road.”42  The EU’s decision to kick-
start bilateral talks with the US and Japan and, subsequently, with 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand was therefore 
informed by the need to both ensure that EU firms would not be left 
at a competitive disadvantage in Asian markets and that the EU 
would have a say in shaping the rules of the global trading system.  
The negotiation of DCFTAs with large developed nations 
would have a direct effect on the content of the EU’s DCFTAs.  
Whereas developing and emerging economies have typically been 
reluctant to engage in regulatory issues, countries such as the US 
and Canada have historically pursued similar trade agendas to the 
EU.  These negotiations were therefore marked by far higher levels 
of ambition in their attempts to tackle regulatory barriers compared 
to those DCFTAs that had previously been concluded in the context 
of the Global Europe strategy.  For example, one way in which the 
CETA and the TTIP departed from previous practice concerned the 
inclusion of “regulatory cooperation” chapters, which established 
institutional mechanisms through which parties could monitor 
market access restrictions resulting from the application of domestic 
regulation, and engage in dialogues to avoid or rectify such 
restrictions.43  These agreements were thus dubbed by the EU as 
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PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S TRADE AGENDA 2016, at 2 (2016), 
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“living agreement[s]”44 in that they envisaged the removal of 
regulatory barriers as an ongoing process.  
In sum, the broad trade policy framework within which the 
EU regulatory agenda is being conducted has changed in important 
ways in recent years.  Commercially-driven trade agreements have 
gone from being seen as interim solutions to address the lack of 
progress in negotiations at the WTO to occupying a central place in 
the EU’s trade policy.  The EU has ramped up trade negotiations 
with a wide variety of countries to secure the commercial interests 
of its firms abroad as well as to reinforce its normative influence in 
global trade governance geo-political objectives.45  This had a 
knock-on effect on the contents of the trade agreements.  As the EU 
engages in negotiations with like-minded countries keen on 
pursuing deeper integration, the trade agreements have become 
more ambitious in terms of the regulatory disciplines included 
therein.  
C. The Contestation of the EU’s DCFTAs 
The regulation of areas which, until fairly recently remained 
the exclusive remit of national parliaments within trade agreements, 
has further exposed the potential of international trade regulation to 
undermine national policy space and democratic accountability.  
These tensions are nothing new—they are at the very root of much 
of the opposition from developing countries towards attempts to 
promote deep integration at either bilateral or multilateral levels.46  
An apt illustration of the problems posed by deep integration can be 
seen in the area of intellectual property, where requirements on 
parties participating in trade agreements to maintain minimum 
                                                            
44 Karel De Gucht, European Trade Comm’r, Press Release, 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Solving the Regulatory 
Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
801_en.htm. 
45 Sandra Lavenex et al., EU and US Regulatory Power Under Strain? 
Emerging Countries and the Limits of External Governance 22 EUR. FOREIGN 
AFF. REV. 1, 1–17 (2017); John Peterson, Choosing Europe or Choosing TTIP?: 
The European Union and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 21 
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 383–401 (2016). 
46 See supra notes 25 & 26 (listing various multilateral and bilateral 
agreements).  
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standards of intellectual property rights have been severely 
criticised.  For developing countries, the obligation to implement 
minimum standards of intellectual property (“IP”) protection within 
their domestic regulatory systems means that they are no longer able 
to adopt the type of policies that would allow for the copying of 
products and technologies patented in developed countries in order 
to promote the growth of technology-intensive domestic 
industries.47 The imposition of IP rules through trade agreements is 
also problematic because such agreements tend to be exclusively 
focused on the protection of the economic interests of IP holders to 
the detriment of conflicting interests, such as the protection of 
consumer rights and human rights.48  The latter point illustrates a 
key problem relating to deep integration – that democratic processes 
that lead to the ratification of trade agreements are ill-suited to 
address complex regulatory issues.  Contrarily, while domestic 
legislative proposals can be carefully scrutinised by national 
parliaments and laws are the result a dialogue between the executive 
and the legislative branches of power, the take-it-or-leave-it 
dynamic underpinning the ratification process means that 
parliaments only have the choice to ratify or reject the text of an 
agreement in full.49   
The emergence of mega trade agreements such as the CETA 
and the TTIP and the Comprehensive TransPacific Partnership 
(CPTPP)50 also create tensions at the multilateral level.  These large-
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Trade Partnership, GOV’T OF CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-
texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). The CPTPP (also 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/2
2019] REGULATING THROUGH TRADE 393 
scale agreements are challenging the centrality of the WTO as a rule-
making venue, in that they allow their main proponents to develop 
new rules on trade which would otherwise have been rejected or, at 
the very least, contested in the framework of the WTO’s unanimity-
based decision-making processes.  The sheer scale and importance 
of the markets covered by mega-regional trade agreements means 
that the rules included therein are likely to be held as global 
standards.  These rules are replicated in future bilateral agreements 
with third countries not involved in the negotiations of mega-
regionals, thus relegating them to the role of rule-takers.  This would 
occur not only because the rules included in such agreements will 
be replicated in future trade agreements, but also because the size of 
the markets covered by these agreements means that any substantive 
harmonization of product standards achieved through regulatory 
cooperation would lead to the creation of de facto global standards.51  
In this way, mega trade agreements and, in particular, the use of such 
agreements to develop new rules, will lead to an increasing 
marginalisation of those countries (mostly developing economies) 
that are not involved in the negotiation process, and, consequently, 
in the shaping of international trade law.  
These challenges to democratic accountability and the global 
trade governance system52 are especially relevant in relation to the 
EU.  Firstly, the concerns regarding the erosion of democratic 
accountability and policy autonomy are heightened in the context of 
the EU’s multi-level system of law-making.  Since its inception, the 
EU has had the exclusive competence on external trade policy 
matters, including the power to negotiate trade agreements on behalf 
                                                            
referred to as the TPP) is an agreement concluded on 24 February 2016 by 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The main proponent of the agreement, 
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51 Dan Ciuriak & Harsha Vardhana Singh, Mega-regional Trade 
Agreements: How Excluded Countries Can Meet the Challenge, in TPP AND 
INDIA: IMPLICATIONS OF MEGA-REGIONALS FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 443, 
453 (Harsha Vardhana Singh ed., 2016).  
52  See Eyal Benvenisti, Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional 
Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law, 23 CONSTELLATIONS 58, 58–
70 (2016) (discussing in-depth the challenges posed to democratic decision-
making processes by recent developments in international trade law). 
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of its Member States.  However, the scope of such competence is 
limited. As the issues addressed in trade agreements have expanded 
dramatically over the course of the past decade, the right of the EU 
to exclusively negotiate and sign these agreements have been 
questioned.  Secondly, concerns have also been raised about the 
potential use of EU trade agreements to bypass internal democratic 
decision-making processes.  This can be achieved by using trade 
agreements to regulate issues that have previously proved 
problematic to legislate domestically (so-called “policy 
laundering”).53  It can also occur through the establishment of 
institutional mechanisms within trade agreements which could 
undermine democratic processes as well as the autonomy of 
domestic institutions.  
As previously discussed, these tensions between the regulatory trade 
agenda and regulatory autonomy are not new, but they have 
increased as a result of the EU’s recently acquired willingness to 
negotiate trade agreements with other trade powers which also have 
their own interests and regulatory preferences to protect.  The 
negotiation of DCFTAs with smaller and developing economies 
proved fairly uncontroversial because the EU could make use of its 
significant bargaining power to impose its regulatory preferences on 
others.  In such agreements, the EU regulatory trade agenda 
amounted to a one-way process whereby the EU would require 
countries to comply to a set of rules chosen by the EU.54  Similar 
agreements with large economies have proved far more 
controversial because the bargaining power symmetries which 
characterise these negotiations mean that the EU must also be 
receptive to regulatory reform demands from its counterparts.  In 
other words, the advent of mega-regional trade agreements such as 
the TTIP has exposed the EU to the adverse consequences that are 
typically associated with deep integration, but which were, until 
fairly recently, mostly felt by developing countries.  Thirdly, the 
EU’s regulatory trade agenda is also problematic because it raises 
questions about the EU’s identity as an international actor.  The EU 
                                                            
53 See Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-
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54 See Maria Garcia & Annick Masselot, EU-Asia Free Trade 
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has historically portrayed itself and has been portrayed by others as 
a distinct foreign policy power which seeks to shape the 
international community by promoting values such as the rule of 
law, democracy, human rights and the commitment to multilateral 
institutions.55 The EU is also constitutionally bound to conduct its 
trade policy in line with foreign policy objectives which reflect these 
aforementioned values.  These aims have been reflected in the EU’s 
own policy statements concerning trade agreements.  For instance, 
a constant refrain from the European Commission is that the EU’s 
DCFTAs must take into account the specific needs of the EU’s 
counterparts (especially those parties that are developing countries) 
and will not be used to undermine the multilateral system.56  But can 
such conceptualisations of the EU’s external action be considered 
valid in the area of trade, where the EU is actively seeking to sign 
trade agreements which are deliberately sidestepping the WTO 
decision making processes in order to promote rules that have 
proven highly contentious and have been steadfastly opposed at the 
multilateral level? 
III. INTERNAL LEGITIMACY OF THE EU REGULATORY AGENDA 
A. Opinion 2/15 and the Role of National Parliaments in the EU 
Trade Agreements 
The exclusivity of the EU’s competence in the area of 
external trade is well established.  It was confirmed by the European 
Court of Justice in its Opinion 1/7557 as an indispensable tool to 
achieve a fully integrated internal market.  Indeed, Member States 
                                                            
55 See Owen Parker & Ben Rosamund, Normative Power Europe’ Meets 
Economic Liberalism: Complicating Cosmopolitanism Inside/Outside the EU, 48 
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 229, 223 (2013); Ian Manners, The European Union 
as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez, 35 J. IN’TL STUD. 167, 170 
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56 EU-Korea FTA, supra note 25, art. 13.4.  
57 See Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, 1975 
E.C.R. 1356 (noting the holding which established external trading is an integral 
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19
396 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:2 
would be able to distort competition within the internal market if 
they were allowed to conduct their own individual trade policies 
and, for example, apply different tariff and non-tariff barriers with 
respect to non-EU imports.58  The ability of the EU to speak with 
one voice in trade matters also made sense from a policy 
perspective, in that it enabled the EU to make more effective use of 
its considerable market power in trade negotiations.59  
The scope of this exclusive competence has long been the 
subject of much debate and change—in large part because the policy 
areas that are encompassed by international trade law and politics 
are constantly evolving and expanding.  When the Treaty of Rome 
was signed back in 1957, the Common Commercial Policy (the term 
used under the EU Treaties to refer to the EU’s external trade policy) 
was described as aiming “to contribute . . . to the harmonious 
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions 
on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers.”60  No 
mention was made as to the type of international economic 
exchanges covered by the Common Commercial Policy—this 
would have been irrelevant at the time, because global commerce 
was largely dominated by trade in goods, and international trade law 
focused the removal of tariffs.  But as international economic 
exchanges diversified and trade policy progressively shifted its 
focus towards non-tariff barriers, the EU was also forced to widen, 
through a succession of Treaty reforms, the remit of its trade policy 
to cover areas such as services, commercial aspects of intellectual 
property61 and, more recently, foreign direct investment.62  
The Treaty reforms have nevertheless continued to struggle 
to keep up with the ever-expanding scope of international trade 
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politics, as reflected in the content of the new generation of EU’s 
DCFTAS.  The question of whether the provisions included in the 
first EU trade agreement concluded in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Libson—the EU-Singapore DCFTA—fell within the EU’s 
exclusive competence or whether they would fall within the EU’s 
shared competence was thus put to the European Court of Justice.  
The answer to that question was of importance in that it 
would provide clarity to the decision-making process that would 
underpin the conclusion and ratification of EU’s DCFTAs and, 
specifically, the role to be played by national parliaments of EU 
Member States in this process.  Should the DCFTAs be deemed to 
fall within the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence, such 
agreements could be concluded by a decision of the Council of 
Ministers after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.  
An agreement that would fall under the shared competence of both 
the EU and Member States—that is, a “mixed” agreement—would 
likely have to be signed and ratified by each one of the EU’s 28 
Member States as well as subnational entities which retain foreign 
policy power in accordance with national constitutions.63  
To the extent that modern trade negotiations are already very 
complex and time-consuming affairs, giving a right of veto to 
national parliaments could discredit the EU as a credible and reliable 
trade negotiator.  For a while, this issue remained one of limited 
practical relevance.  For example, all trade agreements concluded 
by the EU, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010, 
have been negotiated as mixed agreements.64  The vast majority of 
these agreements were concluded and ratified without significant 
hiccups.  However, the problem was thrown into sharp relief in the 
context of the CETA, which was signed as a mixed agreement, 
allowing the Walloon government—a Belgian federal region—to 
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block the approval of the agreement unless the agreement was 
amended to reflect its multiple concerns.65  Although the Walloon 
stand-off was eventually resolved and the agreement was signed, it 
served to illustrate how difficult it would be for the EU to conclude 
comprehensive deep trade agreements if these were considered to 
cover both issues of exclusive and shared competence.  If the EU is, 
practically speaking, incapable of negotiating such agreements, then 
it would be left on the outside looking in to major future trade 
agreements and would no longer be able to play a part in shaping 
the rules of international trade.  
The other side of this debate is that the EU’s exclusive 
competence in trade matters arguably reduces the democratic 
legitimacy of EU’s DCFTAs as it excludes national parliaments 
from the decision-making process.  This point was potently made in 
the 2006 ‘Namur Declaration,’ a document signed by a variety of 
politicians and scholars which  called for, amongst other things, an 
enhancement of democratic parliamentary control procedures 
surrounding the negotiation of EU’s DCFTAs.66  The proposals 
include the establishment of mechanisms through which the 
potential effects of DCFTAs can be analysed and contested, prior to 
the setting of a negotiating mandate and the systematic release of 
interim results of negotiations allowing for parliamentary debate 
prior to the closing of negotiations.67   
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In its Opinion 2/15,68 the Court finally delivered its findings 
on the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence to conclude the EU-
Singapore DCFTA.  Whilst the Court confirmed that the vast 
majority of fields covered in the EU-Singapore DCFTA fell within 
the EU’s exclusive competence, it also ruled that two key 
components of the contemporary EU’s DCFTAs—foreign indirect 
investment and the investor-state-dispute settlement mechanism—
was considered to be a shared competence between the EU and its 
member States.69  
At first sight this would appear to be a positive result for 
those arguing meaningful democratic scrutiny and control over EU’s 
DCFTAs.  Indeed, the Opinion means that, in their current 
incarnation, EU’s DCFTAs would still have to be ratified by 
national parliaments of EU Member States.  However, by 
confirming that the vast majority of provisions included in these 
agreements fell under the exclusive competence of the EU, the Court 
opened the possibility for the EU to consider moving away from its 
practice of concluding EU’s DCFTAs as mixed agreements and 
instead signing them as EU-only trade agreements.70  This approach, 
which has been endorsed by the Council,71 would entail negotiating 
portfolio investment and investor state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) 
in agreements that are distinct from EU’s DCFTAs.  The former 
would be subject to Member State ratification whilst the others 
could be concluded under the article 218 Treaty on European Union 
(“TEU”) procedure. 
At this stage, it remains unclear whether the EU intends to 
systematically carve out portfolio investment and ISDS from its 
DCFTAs to ensure these fall under its exclusive competence.  But if 
this approach was to be followed, it would inevitably lead to the 
further distancing of national parliaments from the EU’s trade 
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policy.  Parliamentary oversight would still be ensured via the 
European Parliament, which retains the right to veto trade 
agreements—and has done so in the past—and has a significant role 
to play in scrutinising trade negotiations.  However, a move away 
from mixed agreements and the resulting removal of national 
parliaments in the process of ratifying trade agreements may prove 
problematic in an environment where EU’s DCFTAs have become 
increasingly politicised and controversial at the national level.72   
In the “Brussels Declaration”73—a document authored by 
the chairman of the European Parliament's Committee on 
International Trade and co-signed by a number of academics—such 
concerns were acknowledged.  The document proposed the 
additional engagement of EU Member States and their national and 
regional parliaments on trade negotiations and an increase in the 
levels of transparency in trade negotiations.  This would be achieved 
by adopting a policy of automatically transmitting negotiating 
directives for trade agreements and publishing such 
recommendations to allow national parliaments and other domestic 
stakeholders to put forward their observations to their 
governments.74  
Such increase in transparency during trade negotiations 
would enable national parliaments to carry out some degree of 
scrutiny.  The scrutiny would, however, remain limited.  Firstly, the 
negotiating drafts published by the EU tend to be the EU’s draft 
proposals and, typically, do not incorporate the counterparty’s 
counter-proposals unless the counterparty in negotiations agrees to 
their release.  The more contentious aspects of negotiations can, of 
course, be made available to national parliaments by national 
governments.   
Indeed, a number of Member States have put in place 
procedures which enable national governments to inform and 
consult with national parliaments on the progress of EU trade 
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negotiations on a regular basis.75  However, relying on Member 
States to consult with national parliament is far from optimal in 
terms of ensuring democratic legitimacy of EU’s DCFTAs.  It 
means that the level of parliamentary scrutiny over agreements will 
vary from one Member State to another depending on whether a 
Member state allows for such consultation, and on the level of 
information national executives opt to share with parliament.  To 
rectify this, it could be worth considering standardising the 
consultation mechanisms at the EU level.  For example, one could 
envisage the establishment of a system of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation that would require the European Parliament to meet 
national parliament representatives on a regular basis.  This would 
ensure that all national parliaments have access to the same level of 
information and would give them an opportunity to submit their 
observations and concerns to the European Parliament. 
B. Regulatory Cooperation in Trade Agreements 
An important addition to the EU’s most recent DCFTAs is 
the inclusion of regulatory cooperation chapters that establish 
administrative governance systems which allow for information 
exchange between regulatory authorities and promote regulatory 
dialogue in order to address the trade disruptive effects of domestic 
regulation.76  These systems reflect a wider trend in global economic 
governance, whereby the need to address complex regulatory issues 
means that traditional forms of international cooperation based on 
state-led negotiations and judicial dispute settlement mechanisms 
are being complemented by less formal, process-based methods of 
international cooperation.77  Efforts to develop disciplines on market 
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regulation at the international level are  increasingly being carried 
out in the context of “transnational systems of . . . regulatory 
cooperation have been  . . . established through international treaties 
and more informal intragovernmental networks of cooperation[.]” 78  
This includes specialized bodies and committees established by 
international organizations in order to administer and implement 
international agreements, transnational networks of national 
regulatory authorities, international standard-setting bodies and 
hybrid public-private organizations.79  The CETA was the first in 
the new generation of commercially-driven deep FTAs concluded 
by the EU to include a horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter.  
This chapter creates a Regulatory Cooperation Forum entrusted with 
the task of monitoring a series of voluntary regulatory cooperation 
activities, from discussing  “regulatory policy issues of mutual 
interest”80 to reviewing regulatory initiatives that are deemed to 
“provide potential for cooperation.”81  The EU has also proposed the 
negotiation of a horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter in the 
TTIP, which would go significantly further than the CETA.82  It 
includes obligations relating to the adoption of good regulatory 
practices (e.g., publication of regulatory agendas and sharing of ex 
ante and ex post analyses) and the establishment of bodies through 
which the exchange of information on regulatory activity can occur.  
These bodies would also be entrusted with the task of assessing 
areas where mutual recognition, or regulatory compatibility could 
be achieved.83  This regulatory chapter also provides for the 
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establishment of a Regulatory Cooperation Body (“RCB”) in the 
TTIP, which would have the task of monitoring all regulatory 
cooperation carried out within the framework of the agreement.  The 
RCB would, for example, monitor implementation of the provisions 
of the regulatory cooperation chapter, discuss and propose new 
initiatives for regulatory cooperation, prepare joint initiatives for 
international regulatory instruments, and ensure transparency of 
regulatory cooperation between parties.84  The RCB would be 
composed of trade officials and representatives of regulatory 
authorities from both parties, who would work alongside ad hoc 
working groups, focusing on sector-specific regulatory issues in 
areas such as chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices, 
car safety standards and services.85 
The purpose of the regulatory cooperation mechanism 
proposed for the TTIP is to create a “living agreement” through 
which the parties can tackle regulatory trade barriers on a continual 
basis.86  The hope is that in time, the institutional and cooperation 
frameworks established by the agreement will foster the type of 
mutual trust and long-term regulatory dialogue that is a prerequisite 
of regulatory convergence.87  The introduction of strong regulatory 
cooperation mechanisms within EU trade agreements have been 
described by some as representing a paradigm shift away from 
classic free trade agreements and towards “transformative trade 
agreements”88 which view deep market integration as an ongoing 
and open-ended process. That regulatory cooperation should be 
pursued in these agreements is logical since the EU, the US, and 
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Canada have historically pursued similar trade agendas and have 
broadly similar regulatory preferences.  This is consistent with the 
idea that regulatory cooperation between advanced economies is 
beneficial, not just because countries stand to gain more from the 
removal of regulatory barriers, but because increased interaction 
between sophisticated regulatory systems can have a positive effect 
on regulatory outcomes.  The argument is that, when faced with 
better regulatory processes, countries will be induced to “improve 
[their] own regulations in order to face the challenges raised by the 
partner’s better regulations[.]”89 In this sense, it has been contended 
that the regulatory cooperation mechanisms envisaged in the TTIP 
could serve as a “transatlantic policy laboratory,”90 enabling parties 
to learn from each other’s regulatory divergences and experiences 
and to develop better regulatory approaches.   
A number of concerns have been voiced in relation to the 
potential impact of these mechanisms on the regulatory autonomy 
and democratic processes of the parties involved. In some respects, 
these concerns have been overplayed.  First, because there is no legal 
obligation in these agreements for the parties to actively pursue 
regulatory cooperation,91  the parties retain the right to decide 
whether or not to make use of these mechanisms.  Second, from a 
constitutional perspective, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
previously ruled that the European Commission’s right of initiative 
with respect to legislative proposals would not be undermined by 
the existence of similar international regulatory cooperation 
mechanisms.92  It is worth noting that past attempts at EU-US 
regulatory cooperation (promoting mutual recognition arrangements 
for product standards) have had very limited success, because the 
voluntary nature of the mechanisms meant that parties often opted 
against pursuing regulatory cooperation.93  The same applies to the 
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voluntary cooperation frameworks envisaged in the CETA and the 
TTIP.94  That such mechanisms may, in practice, influence the 
Commission’s decision to introduce or even affect the content of 
proposals was not viewed as a restriction of the right of initiative, 
but rather as an exercise of this right.95  In any event, it is difficult to 
imagine how deliberation between officials in the RCB could lead 
to substantive changes in the domestic laws of the parties.  Any 
proposed changes to the law would still have to go through the 
applicable decision-making processes and be subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny.96  
These considerations should not, however, distract from the 
fact that these mechanisms ultimately seek to affect the content of 
and the decision-making processes underpinning domestic market 
regulation of the parties involved. This is in part due to the fact that 
these mechanisms have been devised in the wider framework of 
trade agreements and are therefore primarily geared towards 
addressing domestic rules from a trade liberalizing perspective—
that is, that the overriding objective of the cooperation is to remove 
trade distorting effects of domestic regulation.  This presents the 
danger that domestic regulators participating in regulatory 
cooperation will be incentivized to place trade and investment 
considerations above non-economic considerations.97  For example, 
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it has been argued that the proposed requirement to conduct impact 
assessments for planned regulation focuses exclusively on the 
potential impact of the regulation on international trade and 
investment.  Moreover, the requirement on regulatory authorities to 
communicate proposed legislation to each other places them in a 
position where they will be drafting legislation with an external 
audience in mind.98  Concerns have also been raised that past 
regulatory cooperation mechanisms focused on standard-setting 
tended to be ripe for regulatory capture99 and favoured business and 
industry interests over those of civil society stakeholders with fewer 
resources.100  In short, there are a number of features of regulatory 
cooperation which could potentially create a pro-liberalizing and de-
regulatory dynamic in domestic law-making processes.  
The regulatory cooperation components of the EU’s recent 
trade agreements present the EU with a very particular challenge.  
With the increasing focus on regulatory barriers, it was inevitable 
that deep integration efforts would seek to develop soft law 
mechanisms allowing for continual regulatory dialogue and 
oversight, especially between like-minded countries sharing 
similarities in their approach to market regulation. There are 
concerns that regulatory cooperation will “undercut public 
deliberation and remove regulatory governance further from 
democratic oversight,”101  which are overblown.  Regulatory 
cooperation of the type pursued in the CETA and (possibly) in the 
TTIP is not solely about removing regulatory divergences, it is also 
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about creating fora which foster regulatory trust between countries 
by encouraging information exchange and allowing authorities to 
explain the rationale for certain trade disruptive regulations.102  Even 
where there is scope for regulatory convergence or equivalence, 
these cannot be pursued without going through the applicable 
domestic decision making processes.  Finally, past experience 
suggests that, even between like-minded countries, regulatory 
cooperation mechanisms included in DCFTAs tend achieve very 
little103—a striking example of this being the relatively modest 
outcomes realized by previously established regulatory cooperation 
frameworks between the EU and the US.104 
Still, there are legitimate concerns that must be addressed in 
order to ensure that regulatory cooperation mechanisms do not 
influence regulatory processes in a manner which exclusively 
favours trade liberalization goals over other equally legitimate non-
trade goals.  In this respect, further clarity is required on two points.  
It is important that regulatory cooperation in trade agreements is not 
dominated by trade negotiators, but that it also includes regulators 
that understand and are able to take into account non-trade 
regulatory preferences.  By the same token, whilst the regulatory 
cooperation bodies included in EU trade agreements allow for the 
consultation of stakeholders, more thought must be given to creating 
safeguards to ensure that all interests are given an equal voice and 
representation, so that no single group is able to capture the 
process.105 
IV. EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY OF THE EU REGULATORY AGENDA 
A. Regulatory Agenda as an Expression of the EU’s Foreign 
Policy Power 
The manner in which the EU has pursued its regulatory 
agenda has raised questions about the EU’s role as a trade power 
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and, in particular, the impact that the EU’s current emphasis on the 
negotiation of DCFTAs has on external actors and the multilateral 
trading system more generally.106  These questions are relevant 
because they strike at the heart of the debate concerning EU’s 
identity as an international actor and, specifically, the notion of the 
EU as a distinct actor which seeks to influence the international 
community through the diffusion of norms rather than through 
coercive means.  This is best embodied by the notion of the EU as a 
Normative Power, developed by Ian Manners to capture the EU’s 
supposedly qualitatively distinct international identity in 
international relations.107  The conceptual basis of Normative Power 
Europe is that the EU is predisposed to act in a normative way in 
international politics because it is itself a normative construct.108  It 
is in effect a narrative of self-projection where the EU seeks to shape 
the international community in its image by projecting constitutional 
norms such as principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice 
and respect for human rights.109  A second major component of 
Normative Power Europe relates to the process employed by the EU 
to promote its norms.  According to Ian Manners, a normative power 
must not only promote norms but also act in a normative manner 
when doing so.110  This entails an obligation to ensure consistency 
and coherence between the EU’s internal and external norms, and to 
promote norms through cooperation and dialogue rather than 
through coercive means and to reflexively take into account the 
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effect of the promotion of norms on third countries.111  A normative 
foreign policy, therefore, entails the pursuit of normative goals 
through normative means—that is, one that is “justifie[d] . . . by 
making reference to its milieu goals that aim to strengthen 
international law and institutions and promote the rights and duties 
enshrined and specified in international [law].”112 
The salience of Normative Power Europe as a 
conceptualisation of the EU’s identity in international relations is 
such that it was eventually integrated into the constitutional fabric 
of the EU, as the EU Treaties themselves establish a constitutional 
obligation on the EU to ensure that its external action is guided by a 
series of principles, values, and objectives.113  Article 2 of the TEU 
states that that the EU’s external action must uphold values such as 
the “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities.”  The provision is then 
complemented by article 21 TEU which requires the EU to develop 
policies and cooperate to, inter alia, “safeguard its values . . . 
consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights . 
. . improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable 
management of global natural resources and promote an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and 
good global governance.”  Article 207 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TEFU) confirms that the EU’s 
external trade policy must be conducted in the context of the 
principles and objectives of the EU’s external action—something 
which was confirmed in Opinion 2/15, where the Court ruled that 
foreign policy objectives such as sustainable development form “an 
integral part of the common commercial policy.”114  The limited 
case law on these foreign policy values and objectives means that 
their normative value is still a subject of academic debate.  Some 
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have argued that these are justiciable norms with scope for 
enforceability,115 whilst others view them primarily as Treaty 
interpretation tools.116  Nevertheless, the very existence of these 
constitutionally-recognised objectives reinforces the idea of the EU 
as an international actor that is predisposed to project its values and 
norms abroad. 
There are, however, other conceptualisations of the EU as an 
international actor, which contest the assumptions underpinning 
“Normative Power Europe.”  Chad Damro’s idea of a “Market 
Power Europe,” which posits that the basis for the EU’s power lies 
in the size of the internal market, is one that has gained significant 
traction in the field of external trade policy.117  Instead of being a 
normative construct that is predisposed to act normatively, the EU 
is an internal market predisposed to externalise its market norms.  
The inclusion of standards in EU trade agreements is pinpointed by 
Damro as the archetypal example of market power: 
 
The externalization of internal regulatory measures can take place if, for 
example, the EU attempts to include standards in bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements (i.e., positive conditionality). Even if the EU employs 
the tools of positive conditionality with the intent of persuading changes 
in behaviour, the third parties in question may feel they have been coerced 
into changing their behaviour because they have no alternative: they must 
agree to undesirable terms in trade agreements because they need access 
to the large European single market; and they must abide by the EU’s 
relevant internal regulatory measures or they will be subject to sanctioning 
under the associated implementing legislation.118 
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“Market Power Europe” presents the EU as an international 
trade actor that uses the promise of market access or the threat of the 
removal of such access as a coercive tool to influence the behaviour 
of external actors, as opposed to “Normative Power Europe” where 
influence is exerted through normative, non-coercive, means. 
The EU’s current approach to negotiating DCFTAs, 
however, does not fit neatly into either one of these 
conceptualisations.  On the one hand, a number of features typically 
associated with Normative Power Europe can be found in the EU’s 
regulatory agenda.  First, the EU has consistently used its DCFTAs 
to promote fundamental values such as respect of human rights and 
the promotion of sustainable development objectives119.  Second, as 
previously discussed, the EU tends to shy away from using its 
DCFTAs to export EU-specific rules and has opted instead to 
promote international rules and standards.  These agreements can 
therefore be viewed as part of a wider attempt to promote and 
consolidate existing international norms and institutions.120  Third, 
whilst the EU’s trade agreements generally follow a pre-established 
template, the EU has not been averse to differentiating between 
trading partners depending on their particular circumstances and, 
especially, their levels of economic development.121  Rather than 
pursuing a one-size-fits-all policy, the EU has tended to adopt a 
differentiated approach by imposing less onerous regulatory 
disciplines and liberalisation requirements on some developing 
country third parties.122  On the other hand, the EU’s regulatory 
agenda also departs from “Normative Power Europe” in some 
respects.  Whilst the EU has a preference towards the dissemination 
of international norms, it should be noted that these international 
norms are fully incorporated into the EU acquis, and that the EU 
does export EU-specific rules when this is considered to be in its 
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interests.123  At a fundamental level, the Global Europe strategy and 
the decision to focus on the negotiation of bilateral trade deals has 
shown that the EU is ready to use the increased leverage it has in the 
context of bilateral relations to push through the types of 
commitments and reforms it could not secure at the multilateral 
level.  Even accounting for the EU’s willingness to differentiate 
between trade partners, it cannot be ignored that many of the EU’s 
developing country interlocutors rejected the EU’s demands for 
higher standards of intellectual property protection, investment 
protection or rules on competition within the framework of the 
WTO. This is further reinforced by the EU’s recent foray into the 
world of mega-regionals and its stated intent to use such agreements 
to set international rules and standards.  By using trade agreements 
to circumvent opposition at the multilateral level, the EU positions 
itself as a trade power that will readily make use of its economic 
might to impose its agendas, irrespective of their potential impact 
on others.124  There is thus an ongoing internal conflict which has 
characterised the EU’s regulatory agenda, between the projection of 
norms that reflect the EU’s regulatory preferences—in essence 
market liberal norms which have been rejected at the multilateral 
level—and the EU’s commitment to uphold certain values, 
including to reflexively take into account the interest of third 
countries and promote multilateral cooperation.  
 
B. The International Investment Court—Rebirth of Normative 
Power Europe? 
 
This tension is aptly illustrated by the EU’s recent 
experience in designing investment protection and investment 
arbitration rules. International investment law, as it currently exists, 
is a fragmented legal system populated mostly by bilateral 
investment treaties (“BITs”), which regulate investment 
liberalisation and protection and subject disputes to ISDS 
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mechanisms.  It is a field of law which has been increasingly 
contested by developing countries because the rules included in 
BITs are seen as highly skewed in favour of the protection of foreign 
investments (typically originating from developed, capital exporting 
countries) to the detriment of the rights of host states (typically 
developing, capital importing countries) to regulate.  For example, 
the obligation to ensure fair and equitable treatment (FET), the most 
important substantive standard included in BITs, requires host states 
to refrain from adopting measures that would affect the legitimate 
expectations that were taken into account by investors when the 
decision to invest was made.  Arbitral tribunals have identified 
various benchmarks to determine the legitimate expectations of 
foreign investors; from the status of the host state’s legal order at the 
time when the investment was made, contractual arrangements 
between the foreign investor and the host state or unilateral 
representations made by the host State to the foreign investor.125  
The expectations based on the regulatory environment of the host 
State have proved to be problematic in that they have, on occasion, 
been interpreted by arbitral tribunals as creating an obligation not to 
modify the regulatory environment in a manner that would frustrate 
such expectations.126  This has led to accusations that BITs result in 
“regulatory chill”—that is, that they act as a disincentive for host 
states to regulate for fear of falling foul of the agreements.127  The 
ISDS system has also come in for severe criticism.  There are 
concerns regarding the perceived partiality of arbitrators who are 
accused to have consistently promoted neo-liberalist and pro-
investor interpretations of BITs,128 the lack of transparency of 
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investment arbitration procedures as well as the inconsistent body 
of case law which inevitably results from the multiplicity of ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals.129  
These concerns have led a number of countries to reconsider 
their approach to international investment law.  Large developed 
economies like the US and Canada have re-drafted their Model BITs 
with the aim to strike a more appropriate balance between the rights 
of foreign investors and the rights of host states to regulate.130  
Developing countries have also increasingly taken a leading role in 
this recalibration of international investment law—one recent 
example being India’s new Model BIT, which is so skewed in favour 
of safeguarding the regulatory autonomy of host states, that it has 
been described as an attempt by India to “immunize itself from 
future BIT claims.”131  Some countries, such as Ecuador, have gone 
further by contemplating exiting the sphere of international 
investment law completely and terminating all of their BITs.132  
The EU has tried to follow this general trend towards the 
recalibration of international investment law by designing 
investment protection chapters in its trade agreements which present 
a number of distinctive features.  Firstly, the EU has opted not to 
adopt a Model BIT, but rather to adopt a flexible and differentiated 
approach to negotiation of investment protection rules.133  The 
European Commission explained this approach arguing that a “one-
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size-fits-all model for investment agreements . . . would necessarily 
be neither feasible nor desirable” and that “. . . the level of 
development of [the EU’s] partners should guide inter alia the 
standards the Union sets in a specific investment negotiation.”134  
The European Commission also specified that investment protection 
rules “should also be guided by the principles and objectives of the 
Union’s external action more generally, including the promotion of 
the rule of law, human rights and sustainable development.”135  
Furthermore, in a nod to the potential effect of international 
investment law on the EU’s own regulatory autonomy, the European 
Commission added that its approach to investment protection rules 
had  
to fit with the way the EU and its Member States regulate economic 
activity within the Union and across our borders. Investment agreements 
should be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member 
States, including policies on the protection of the environment, decent 
work, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, 
development policy and competition policy.136   
 
In short, from the outset, the EU signaled its intent to design 
flexible investment protection rules and ISDS systems which 
balanced investor protection interest against those of the host state 
to regulate in pursuit of public interest objectives. 
Initially, the reality fell some way short of these grand 
designs.  Whilst there were instances of innovation - notably 
attempts to limit the scope of problematic investment protection 
standards (e.g., FET, full security and protection and expropriation) 
and the inclusion of additional procedural safeguards in the ISDS 
mechanisms, the first EU trade agreements comprising investment 
protection chapters (CETA and the EU-Singapore DCFTA) were 
largely based on the texts of the US and Canadian Model BITs.137  
The EU was, however, forced to reconsider its approach when it was 
faced with a barrage of criticisms after initiating the negotiations of 
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the EU-US TTIP, particularly relating to its plans to include an 
investment chapter in the agreement.138  These criticisms eventually 
led the European Commission to launch an online public 
consultation exercise where it asked stakeholders to voice their 
views on the EU’s proposed text for a TTIP investment protection 
chapter (based on the text of the CETA).139  The response was 
overwhelmingly negative with many contending that the text did not 
go far enough in terms of securing the EU’s right to regulate and 
that ISDS should be excluded from the TTIP altogether.140  The EU 
responded, in turn, by publishing a “Concept Paper” proposing 
further changes to its investment protection chapter in the TTIP that 
would address the concerns domestically.141  With respect to 
substantive standards, the changes proposed remained quite modest.  
It was suggested that future trade agreements should include: (i) an 
operational provision confirming the right of the parties to take 
measures to achieve public interest objectives; and (ii) a provision 
clarifying that the agreement would not affect the right of the parties 
to discontinue or request the reimbursement of subsidies should 
such subsidies be considered illegal.142  However, the Concept Paper 
ushered a real departure from current international investment law 
practice by putting forward a significant revamp of the ISDS 
mechanism in its trade agreements by including innovative features 
that were specifically intended to address the many flaws typically 
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associated with ISDS and, more generally, international investment 
law.143  This would include, for example, stringent rules on the 
appointment of arbitrators, the possibility for the arbitral tribunals 
to accept amicus curiae briefs and the establishment of appellate 
mechanisms.144  Some of these proposals have since been 
incorporated in EU trade agreements (CETA and EU-Vietnam 
DCFTA) and are currently being discussed in the context of ongoing 
negotiations (e.g., TTIP145).  But by far the most transformative 
suggestion made by the EU in the Concept Paper relates to the 
possibility of creating a Multilateral Investment Court (“MIC”), 
which would replicate many of the innovative features found in EU 
trade agreements.146  The most important aspect of the proposal 
concerns the idea of creating two levels of judicial controls whereby 
rulings delivered in the first instance by an arbitral tribunal could be 
subsequently reviewed by an appellate body.  Such an appellate 
mechanism would promote consistency in case law and improve the 
predictability of investment arbitration rulings.  The Concept Paper 
also includes rules that would seek to ensure the independence and 
impartiality of judges.   Members of the tribunal or appellate body 
are appointed for fixed terms, paid a fixed monthly retainer fee and 
subject to strong ethical requirements that address potential conflicts 
of interest.147  Additionally, the Paper includes rules intended to 
enhance transparency (publication of documents and participation 
rights for third parties148), to reduce procedural costs in order to 
promote the use of the system by smaller economies and small and 
medium sized enterprises,149 and to avoid abuses of procedure (e.g., 
parallel or manifestly unfounded claims150).  
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The extent to which the EU’s proposals truly represent a 
paradigm shift is the subject of some debate.  Some commentators 
have argued that the proposals merely recycle existing rules and 
mechanisms and point to difficulties in ensuring a transition from a 
BIT-dominated system to a permanent multilateral system.151  
Others have taken a far more positive outlook by describing the 
EU’s proposal as a “brave initiative and an innovative reform 
blueprint for ISDS,”152 and commended the EU’s multilateral 
approach as a “superior forum to investor-state arbitration.”153  
Irrespective of the potential benefits or deficiencies of the EU’s 
proposal for an MIC, it remains a significant attempt by the EU to 
take a leadership role in the reform of international investment law 
in a manner that is consistent with the idea of a Normative Power 
Europe.  From the outset, the EU has sought to design rules that take 
into account its values, principles, objectives, and, in particular, 
rules that would reflect the right of states to regulate in the public 
interests.154  Further, the EU has been mindful of both its’ interest 
and concerns and those of external actors.  The EU’s proposal thus 
addresses dissatisfaction with ISDS voiced not just domestically, 
but also internationally. In this regard, it is significant that not only 
do the EU’s proposals for a MIC address many of the broad 
complaints aimed at ISDS, but they also put forward ideas that relate 
specifically to developing country concerns, such as cost reduction 
initiatives and special assistance for developing countries.  It is also 
significant that the EU has sought to develop its’ proposals in an 
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inclusive manner155 To do this, the EU has used trade agreements to 
incrementally promote and garner support for the MIC model.  Thus, 
the CETA and the EU-Vietnam DCFTA both replicate the dual 
judiciary control system envisaged by the MIC and include a 
commitment from the parties to enter into negotiations for the 
establishment of the MIC.  In the meantime, the investment court 
proposal has been tabled by the EU in the context of the ongoing 
TTIP and EU-China Investment Agreement negotiations.156  But 
besides trade agreements, the EU (alongside Canada) has also 
actively endeavoured to engage the wider international community 
to in the project.  The EU and Canada have co-sponsored inter-
governmental meetings in Nairobi and Geneva, whether within the 
framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD),157 the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”),158 and the World Economic 
Forum (WEF)159 were even within margins of these organisations160 
to gauge the appetite for the establishment of the MIC and to give 
third countries an opportunity to shape and take ownership of the 
proposals.  This, again, bears the hallmarks of Normative Power 
Europe.  Not only is the EU seeking to project itself in a manner 
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which seeks to take into account the considerations beyond its self-
interest—to do “least harm”161—it is doing so by both engaging with 
external actors and by promoting dialogue and participation in 
cooperative frameworks within existing international institutions.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent events have put the spotlight back on international 
trade politics. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU and 
the results of the presidential elections in the US have been 
presented in some quarters as a rejection of the liberal trade policies 
of economic globalisation and, more generally, as part of a gnawing 
sense on the part of certain segments of the electorate that 
globalisation and the international legal structures that underpin it 
have eroded national autonomy and democratic accountability.  
These are the same concerns that have been fuelling the growing 
contestation of the EU regulatory agenda.  
As discussed in this Article, the EU regulatory agenda 
pursues perfectly legitimate goals.  The regulatory dimension of EU 
DCFTAs is intended to address very real market access restrictions 
which EU firms and exporters encounter when doing business 
abroad.162  Promoting rules and standards abroad that reflect EU 
regulatory preferences facilitates market access for EU firms abroad 
and expands its normative sphere of influence.  This proved fairly 
uncontroversial while the EU negotiated DCFTAs that were 
vehicles for the exportation of EU and international standards to 
smaller economies.  But the negotiation of more ambitious EU 
DCFTAs with large trade powers has brought home questions 
concerning the legitimacy of the regulatory agenda.  Some of these 
questions will find answers within the realm of EU law.  The 
recently delivered Opinion 2/15 confirmed that most of the 
provisions included in the EU’s DCFTAs do fall within the scope of 
the EU’s exclusive competence.  In the future, we can also expect 
challenges regarding other aspects of these DCFTAs, such as the 
compatibility of ISDS mechanisms with EU law.  
Other questions, however, will require some introspection 
on the part of the EU and a careful examination of the type of 
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measures that can be taken to recalibrate its regulatory agenda in a 
manner that enhances its legitimacy domestically and abroad.  In 
this respect, the EU’s recent experience in designing the investment 
protection chapters of its DCFTAs can be held up as a shining 
example of the positives that can be derived from exposing the 
regulatory components of its DCFTAs to a more broad-based 
democratic debate.  The EU’s decision to conduct an online public 
consultation and its response to the criticisms levelled at its 
investment protection chapters has led to the development of 
genuinely innovative reform proposals which tackle many of the 
flaws associated with international investment law system.  A 
similar approach should be followed in relation to the regulatory 
cooperation chapters of these DCFTAs which, as things stand, lend 
themselves to capture by special interest groups.  More generally, 
there is also a discussion to be had as to how best to achieve a 
balance between the need to conduct an effective EU trade policy 
and the need to garner broad democratic support for those DCFTAs 
which delve into delicate regulatory issues.  Here, despite the 
exclusive nature of the EU’s trade competence, it may be worth 
considering a constitutional reconfiguration in this field which 
would enhance the role of national parliaments in the negotiation 
process.  
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